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Stochastic  Dynamic  Modeling:  An Aid to
Agricultural Lender Decision  Making
Cole  R. Gustafson
Factors affecting a lender's decision to grant farmers operating credit in North Dakota
are  quantified in an intertemporal loan profitability  model using stochastic  dynamic
programming.  Experimental  data obtained from a panel of lenders  demonstrates the
sensitivity of an optimal policy  to changes  in a lender's discount rate,  a borrower's
repayment  status, and patronage. The value of credit scoring models that appraise  a
borrower's  credit worthiness also is determined.
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An  apparent  paradox  exists  in  agricultural
credit.  Despite high levels  of default and neg-
ative rates of return, lenders continue to grant
operating  credit  to  established  farmers  with
whom they have no prior business experience.
In North Dakota,  6.9% of all farmers  change
financial institutions annually (Leistritz et al.).
A discontinued  line  of credit  is  not the sole
reason farmers change lenders.  Credit-worthy
farmers may shift  lenders to obtain more  fa-
vorable terms, expanded financial services, and
increased  security.1
Lenders  have  difficulty  appraising  the  re-
payment  potential  of prospective  borrowers
because  available  financial  records  are  often
incomplete, nonstandard, based on accounting
rather  than  economic  principles,  and  fail  to
incorporate the operator's managerial and en-
trepreneurial abilities (Fisher and McGowan).
Due to this informational  asymmetry, lenders
only obtain true knowledge  of the borrower's
operation  through trial and experience.
Traditional  loan  profitability  analyses  are
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' Melichar  discusses  risks associated  with  patronizing  a weak
financial institution.  Problems faced by credit-worthy  farm  bor-
rowers when their lender fails include inconvenience, lower credit
availability,  and  capital  losses (if the  institution's stock  was  re-
quired to  be purchased  as part  of the  original  loan agreement).
Borrowers who are delinquent  and in a weak financial  condition
face greater risks including possible  foreclosure.
static  in nature and  fail to value  this educa-
tional  process.  After  granting  credit  for  one
period, lenders  obtain information that  suffi-
ciently  improves  decision  making  in  subse-
quent periods.  Therefore,  extension of credit
over a period of time may be profitable to the
lender even though expected returns in the first
period are negative.
The objective  of this article is to formulate
an  intertemporal loan profitability  model us-
ing stochastic dynamic programming (DP) and
evaluate a lender's optimal credit granting pol-
icy in a dynamic rather  than a static setting.
The importance of  the lender's time preference
for money, a customer's repayment status, and
patronage  will be demonstrated.  Organization
of  the paper is as follows: the first section brief-
ly  describes  the extent and  characteristics  of
the lender's  management problem.  This gen-
eral discussion is followed by specification  of
a  stochastic  DP  model.  An  experiment  de-
signed to collect data from a panel of lenders
for purposes of model estimation is discussed
in the third section.  Statistical results and op-
timal decision rules are presented in the fourth
section. The final section summarizes and dis-
cusses limitations of the study's findings.
The Lender's Dilemma
Lenders granted $1.98  billion of nonreal-estate
credit to North Dakota farmers in 1986  (U.S.
Department of Agriculture). This total consists
of both  operating  and intermediate  debt.  To
reduce  transaction costs and increase flexibil-
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ity, lenders frequently  combine  both types of
debt into  a single,  renewable "master note."2
Hence, intermediate  credit is often treated  as
operating  credit.  Each  year lenders  must  de-
cide whether  to grant operating credit to new
and existing customers who  apply.
Lenders  undertake  a  large  risk when  oper-
ating credit is granted  to new farm customers
with  low  probabilities  of  repayment.  Loan
losses,  defined  as  the amount  uncollected  on
a defaulted  loan,  are  costly to  a financial  in-
stitution (Gustafson, Saxowsky,  and  Braaten;
Lee  and  Baker).  When  a borrower  defaults,
lenders  lose uncollected  principal  and acqui-
sition and administrative costs.3 Due to recent
periods  of financial  stress  in the agricultural
sector,  large  loan  losses,  declining  loan  vol-
ume,  and  deregulation,  financial  institutions
in rural communities are especially vulnerable
to failure.  Since farmers  of varying financial
strengths  apply  for  operating  credit,  lenders
must evaluate each  applicant's credit worthi-
ness to avoid adverse  selection.
Some lenders  formally appraise borrowers.
Credit scoring methods evaluate a borrower in
terms of liquidity, leverage,  profitability,  col-
lateral,  tenure,  repayment  capacity  and  his-
tory, management  ability, and other personal
characteristics. However, as Lufburrow, Barry,
and Dixon note, "In general, credit evaluations
have mostly occurred through the personal ob-
servations  and  subjective  judgments  of loan
officers,  using  what  data  farmers  have  sup-
plied."
Static  loan profitability models price  loans
in accordance with perceived risks.  Loans are
priced  explicitly  through  the  use  of interest
rates, fees,  and  service  charges as  well as  im-
plicitly  by  requiring  compensating  balances,
loan limits, collateral, loan documentation, and
supervision  (Barry and Calvert).
Credit rationing occurs when lenders are un-
able to price loans that meet profit goals, costs
of funding, and administration  as well as com-
pensate for lending and liquidity risks (Stiglitz
and Weiss). In  1984, 9.3% of all North Dakota
farmers were refused credit, largely because of
insufficient equity or farm income (Watt et al.).
2 With a "master" loan, lenders have the option of  denying credit
and adjusting intermediate  loan terms annually.
3 Even  though  crop  insurance  and  collateral  liens  reduce  the
likelihood of operating loan losses,  North  Dakota statutory  laws,
such  as confiscatory  price,  effectively  prevent  timely  lender col-
lections from  delinquent  borrowers. Thus,  lenders  frequently re-
duce interest rates,  reschedule payments, and extend maturities in
an attempt to avoid a borrower's default. As Gustafson, Saxowsky,
and Braaten show, these  actions are still very costly to lenders.
Ironically,  lenders  continue  to grant  credit
to  selected  new applicants  on a  trial basis-
fully  expecting above average  rates of default
and  negative  returns.  Although  the  decision
appears irrational in light of pricing and credit
rationing options available, granting credit for
one period permits discrimination  of borrow-
ers in the future because  some new borrowers
will repay while others default.  As lenders re-
vise probabilities of loan repayment based on
this new information, the initial credit granting
decision  becomes  rational  and  profit  maxi-
mizing  when  considered  in  a  multiperiod
framework. Hence, lenders are willing to incur
a significant  short-run cost in an effort to  ac-
quire  long-term  customers.  Factors  affecting
these  tradeoffs  in  the  lender's  decision  are
mathematically illustrated with a stochastic DP
model.
Dynamic  Loan Profitability Model
Stochastic  DP is a  convenient  means  of ex-
plicitly  evaluating the expected  present value
of future credit extensions. Optimization prob-
lems  with  separable  objective  functions  and
discrete  decision  variables  are readily  solved
by  DP  and  yield  optimal  decision  rules  for
decision makers (Dreyfus and Law; Taylor and
Burt).  The following  model  is similar to one
formulated  by  Bierman  and  Hausman  for
commercial  trade  credit  in the  sense  that  it
accounts  for the dynamics  of repayment  but
differs in the sense that it is applied empirically
and accounts  for greater detail including  par-
tial repayment.  The model abstracts from the
considerable  detail  involving  compensating
balances,  alternative  fund  sources,  and  user
costs embodied in traditional loan profitability
models  so  the  stochastic  and  dynamic  rela-
tionships presented  can be clearly illustrated.
Further, the model does not consider the port-
folio effects of  granting additional credit. How-
ever,  diversification  opportunities  for  many
rural lenders are limited.
Extending  credit to unfamiliar  farmers is a
risky  decision for lenders because  repayment
is uncertain.  Assume the borrower is initially
in one of the following mutually exclusive re-
payment  states  i: (a) full  repayment  of prin-
cipal  and  interest,  (b)  repayment  of interest
only,  and  (c)  default.  Further,  assume j  rep-
resents  the borrower's  state  one period  later.
A static, but stochastic, loan profitability mod-
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el with expected profit ir (n,  i) from a borrower
in state i at period n can be defined as:
(1)  (n,  i) =  ,  p(n, i, j)
j=l
*[REV(n, i,j)-  CF(n)
-AO(n,  i, j)  - LL(n, i,j)],
where the probability  of transition from  state
(n,  i) to state (n +  1, j) is p(n, i, j), REV(n,  i,
j)  is  uncertain  gross  revenue  from  lending,
CF(n)  is a lender's cost of funds which is known
in advance, AO(n,  i, j) are administrative  and
overhead  expenses,  and  LL(n,  i, j)  is  a loan
loss  charge  for unrecovered  principal.  Gross
revenue is obtained from borrowers who repay
fully or repay interest only on outstanding debt
and is zero from borrowers who default.  Loan
maturities  are  assumed  to  be  extended  and
terms of the loan renegotiated when borrowers
default  on their principal payments.  Admin-
istrative and operating expenses vary with re-
payment  status.  Loan  losses  arise  when  bor-
rowers  default.
Lenders are assumed to maximize expected
monetary values. These values consist of both
current returns and the present value of  returns
from future credit extensions. Initially, lenders
must decide whether to extend or deny credit
to a new applicant. If losses from credit exten-
sion are  expected  to  exceed returns,  credit  is
denied  and  the firm's  return  is  zero.4 If ex-
pected returns are positive, credit is extended,
and a likelihood  exists that the customer will
again  apply for credit in future  periods.  One
period later, lenders must again decide wheth-
er to extend or deny credit.  As long as  credit
is granted,  the problem  recurs  in subsequent
periods, and returns from those future periods
must be considered in solving the present de-
cision. This recurrence relationship is the fun-
damental  theorem  of DP and can be used to
specify  an  intertemporal  loan  profitability
model as follows:
(2)  f(n, i) = 0  for n = N
f(n, i) = max[profits  from extending
credit, profits from
denying credit]
max -r(n, i) + a  p(n, i,  j)
j=l
4 Costs associated with credit analysis are considered sunk costs
because they are incurred regardless of the lending  decision.
f(n  + 1,i,j), 0
for n < N,
where fJn, i) is the expected value of an opti-
mum policy of credit extension from period n
to the horizon, 6 is a discount factor,  and a is
the probability  a borrower chooses to patron-
ize the financial institution again in n +  1 pro-
viding the loan is either fully or partially repaid
in  n.5 It  is a  borrower-choice  variable,  over
which the lender has no control.
J
The  term  ab  6  p(n, i j)f(n  +  1  i, j)  repre-
j=1
sents the value of future credit extensions. The
present value  of these  extensions approaches
zero as n increases because of discounting and
the possibility  of borrower patronage  ceasing.
These conditions thereby permit a finite anal-
ysis and define ending conditions. Horizon year
N is the point where the value of the recursive
function is zero. Terminating before this date
could change the initial decision, although any
change  is  likely  to  be  insignificant  for most
practical problems.
The dynamic loan model above has a num-
ber  of desirable  characteristics.  It allows  for
prior  probabilities  of payment,  includes  the
potential for future profit, and permits system-
atic revision of repayment probabilities based
on past experience (Bierman and Hausman).
Transition  probabilities  from  one  state  to
another can be either estimated with historical
data  or  subjectively  specified.  Bierman  and
Hausman did not consider partial repayment
and conveniently modeled the transition func-
tion as a Bernoulli trial. Cumulative outcomes
(probabilities of repayment) over time formed
a binomial  process with unknown  parameter
p, a random  variable distributed according to
a beta probability  density function.  Revision
of  prior  probabilities  is  remarkably  simple
(Raiffa and Schlaifer), but requires that (a) an
applicant  desires a constant dollar amount of
credit each period, and (b) probabilities of re-
payment  are stationary  over the decision ho-
rizon.  Such assumptions are difficult  to make
if granting  operating  credit  alters  a  farmer's
leverage or wealth positions over time.
To keep the above  DP model manageable,
5The  model assumes  loanable  funds  are  unconstrained.  Even
though fund shortages  have occurred  historically,  overall deregu-
lation of financial  institutions and elimination of interest rate ceil-
ings in particular  reduce the likelihood of shortages in the future.
In addition,  partial granting of the loan request  and other credit
responses are not permitted.
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a  traditional  Markovian  relationship  for  re-
payment is postulated:
(3) p(n,  i, j) = Prob (xn+l  = j Ix  = i),
indicating the probability of transition to state
j  is conditional upon the current state  i. Tran-
sition  probabilities  p(n,  i, j) have  the  usual
statistical properties:
(4)  0  - p(n, i,j)< 1,  n  i;
(5)
J
p(n, i, j)  = 1,
j=l
n, i.
Experimental Method and Data
Collection  Procedures
Data to parameterize the model were collected
in an experimental  setting during which lend-
ers'  responses to a simulated borrowing  situ-
ation were elicited. Lenders  were able to learn
the borrower's true performance  with the pas-
sage of time. Their credit responses  were then
evaluated in light of the educational  process.
The experimental method was selected over
other survey methods because it (a) provided
the necessary quantitative and probabilistic in-
formation  for model estimation,  (b) obtained
lenders'  responses  to  a specific  management
problem, and (c) minimized  the possibility of
extraneous  variables  influencing  the  lender's
decision. Arrow and Simon advocate using ex-
perimental  methods  when investigating  deci-
sion-making behavior.  In addition,  the meth-
od has been  successfully  used in the study of
Illinois cash grain farmers' investment behav-
ior (Gustafson,  Barry,  and Sonka).
Two representative  farm situations,  one lo-
cated in the Red River Valley  and  the other
in the  East  Central region  of North Dakota,
were constructed to reflect diverse areas of  cash
grain production  in the  state.  Data  were  ob-
tained from adult vocational agriculture  farm
business summaries (Watt, Johnson, and Ali).
The Valley farm consisted of 1,385 acres, and
the  East  Central  farm  involved  2,855  acres.
Crops representative  of each  region (continu-
ous and fallow wheat,  barley,  and sunflowers
on the East Central farm and continuous  and
fallow  wheat,  barley,  and  sugarbeets  on  the
Valley farm) were raised; no livestock was pro-
duced,  and crop  sales were assumed to occur
at  harvest.  Participation  in government  pro-
grams was permitted,  and no off-farm income
was available. The Valley farm cash rented 290
acres,  whereas  the  East  Central  farm  share
rented  1,640  acres.  Financial  statements  for
each farm were prepared with the aid of a sim-
ulation model.6
Financial  characteristics  of the farms were
structured to represent an established borrow-
er  who was  seeking  a lender  with lower cost
financing.  Debt-to-asset ratios were set to .40
for each farm. A panel of farm lenders located
outside  each  region  considered  these  ratios
representative  and  served as  a pretest  mech-
anism  for the study.
The first situation was presented to five ran-
domly  selected  lenders  who  granted  farmers
credit  in  the  geographic  region  surrounding
Wahpeton,  North Dakota, and Breckenridge,
Minnesota,  and the second  situation  was  in-
troduced to six farm lenders in the Jamestown
and Valley  City, North Dakota,  areas.7 Each
lender was from a unique commercial bank or
Farm Credit Services'  office. These two areas
were  selected because  of the high  concentra-
tion of financial institutions in predominately
rural areas of homogeneous  farm production.
During  the experiment,  lenders  were  pro-
vided with  a biographical  sketch  of the bor-
rower and with historical and projected  finan-
cial  statements  from  the  simulation  model.
Lenders  described  the characteristics  of their
institution and were asked if they would grant
the operating loan request (figure  1). If the ini-
tial  request  was  denied,  the experiment  was
terminated.
If operating credit was granted, lenders were
asked  to specify credit  terms,  to subjectively
estimate the likelihood the case farm borrower
would transit to one of the three possible  re-
payment states and future customer patronage,
and to estimate the administrative,  operating,
and  loan  loss  expenses  associated  with  each
state. After these data were elicited, the finan-
cial  performance  of the case  farm  was  simu-
lated again for each resulting repayment state.8
One  at  a  time,  updated  financial  statements
(illustrating  the case  farm's possible  financial
position and credit application one year hence)
6 The  selected model was the Farm Financial Simulation Model
(FFSM)  developed by Schnitkey,  Barry,  and Ellinger.  FFSM is a
multiyear  spreadsheet  of a farm's financial  performance  that re-
ports results in terms of a set of coordinated financial  statements.
7  One additional  lender in the  Wahpeton  area  and two  in the
Valley City-Jamestown area were contacted but removed from the
sample, because  they did not grant  operating credit to farmers.
8 As in Gustafson, Barry,  and Sonka,  yields, commodity prices,
farm income,  and asset  values of the case  farms were  randomly
varied between  the  first- and  second-year  decision  situations  in
order to add an element of uncertainty  to the simulation.
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Randomly selected lender
Describe lender's  financial Institution
Discuss case farm's loan request
I~  I,,--  ,,Proceed  with  next state
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_  . uu9 lenier grani  loan request r  --  rirst  year-
Hv  eyes
Have lender  specify:
1. Credit terms
2. Transition  probabilities
3.  Expenses  associated with each state  i
I
Second year completed?  yes  Terminat
no  A
Simulate performance of case farm under next payment  state
I
Figure 1.  Experimental procedure
were  provided to  the lender  and  the  experi-
mental process repeated.
To  minimize  the respondent's  burden,  the
experiment  was  only conducted  for two  con-
secutive periods. After the second session was
completed,  lenders  were  informally  asked  if
third-period  expectations  would  significantly
differ from  those of the second period,  given
that additional information (more trials) would
be available. All of the surveyed lenders stated
additional  information  would  not alter their
expectations.
The main disadvantage of the experimental
method is the abstraction from actual decision
situations.  In an  effort to validate the  experi-
mental approach, a research assistant made an
incognito  formal  application  for  operating
credit  to one  of the financial  institutions  se-
lected for pretest. The loan officer's supervisor
(who was informed of the trial) was instructed
to elicit the loan officer's  subjective estimate
of the applicant's  probability  of full,  partial,
and no repayment if the loan application were
forwarded for review and processing.  Similar
data to that of the case farm were used to com-
plete the loan application.
One week  later,  the  same loan  officer  was
asked to participate in the experiment. In both
instances, the loan officer granted the operating
loan request and provided identical probabil-
ity  estimates.  Although  the  loan officer  may
have  offered rote responses,  he did so in both
real-world  and experimental  settings.
Results
Data collected during the experiment are sum-
marized  in table  1. All  institutions surveyed
had assets of less than $100  million.  The av-
erage  number of agricultural  operating  loans
granted annually per  institution ranged  from
42  to  250.  The  size  of these  operating  loans
averaged $84,636. Loan size was the only vari-
able that  differed  statistically  by  region.  Op-
erating loans in the Red River Valley averaged
$120,400,  while  operating  loans  granted  to
farmers  in  the  East Central  region  averaged
$54,833.  This  difference  reflects  the varying
capital requirements  of farms in each region.
Assets  of the representative  Valley  farm  to-
taled $1.362  million versus $.566 million for
the East Central farm. Profit margins on lend-
er's operating  loans averaged  .77%  after cost
of funds,  administrative  costs,  and  loan  loss
charges  were deducted.
Farmers with operating loans at these insti-
tutions were expected to remain customers for
nearly 20 years.  Lenders  explained  that even
in light of the recent  financial crisis,  farmers
still  used available  profits  to  purchase  addi-
tional assets and expand the size of their busi-
nesses  as  opposed  to  reducing  existing  debt
levels.
Table  1.  Characteristics of Financial  Institutions Surveyed
Standard
Item  Mean  Deviation
Number of operating loans outstanding  120  55
Average  operating loan size (dollars)  84,636  60,858
Current interest charged on operating loans (%)  11.71  1.02
Average  cost of funds  (%)  7.85  .92
Administrative  costs and loan losses (%)  3.09  .72
Average length of time farmers remain customers  of institution  (years)  19.5  6.9 ers,  remain custom"~ ~ ~ ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  1'.  6.9
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Table 2.  Conditional Operating Loan Repay-
ment Probabilities Elicited from Survey Lend-
ersa
Probability  of:
Status of Case  Full  Partial  No
Farm Borrower  Repayment Repayment Repayment
New Customer  87.82  5.45  6.73
(5.27)  (2.58)  (3.85)
Existing Customer  who Repaid
Previous Operating Loan:
Fully  96.36  2.64  1.00
(1.92)  (1.57)  (1.04)
Partially  69.82  23.36  6.82
(19.71)  (15.98)  (7.40)
No Repayment  20.00  25.55  54.45
(22.58)  (19.93)  (28.83)
a Standard deviations  are shown in parentheses.
Elicited  Repayment Probabilities
Subjectively  estimated  conditional  probabili-
ties of repayment elicited from the lenders are
shown in table  2. After  evaluating the repre-
sentative new customer,  all of the lenders  de-
cided  to grant the  case farm's operating  loan
request.  On average,  lenders expected full  re-
payment with  87.8%  probability,  payment of
interest  only  with  5.5%  probability,  and  de-
fault with 6.7% probability.
After granting  operating  credit for one  pe-
riod, lenders had more information to appraise
the case farm's credit worthiness.  Lenders be-
lieved  that if the  case farm  borrower  repaid
the  first period  operating loan,  the farm  was
more  likely to do  so in the future  as  the  ex-
pected  probability  of default  dropped  from
6.73% to  1%.  Similarly, if the farm  defaulted,
it  was expected  to do  so again in the future.
The probability of default,  conditional  on the
borrower  paying only interest  on the first pe-
riod loan, is not statistically different from that
of a  new  borrower-although  probability  of
full repayment  is less. Unlike the uniform  ex-
pectations  lenders  have for  a  case  farm bor-
rower who fully repays past loans, lenders'  es-
timates of future repayment  status are highly
variable  for  a borrower  who  either  partially
repaid or defaulted  on previous  loans.
The probabilities elicited are stationary with
respect to time. This is consistent with lenders'
statements  that a farmer's  leverage positions
and susceptibility to financial risks remain sta-
Table  3.  Present  Value  of  Optimal  Credit
Granting Policy  at Each  Decision  Stage
Borrower's  Repayment  Status, Last Period
Year  Full  Partial  Default
------------------------------------  --- $ ----------------------------------------
1  1,190a
2  1,882  1,178  -4,585b
3  1,881  1,177  4,585b
4  1,880  1,176  -4,585b
5  1,878  1,174  -4,585b
6  1,875  1,172  -4,585b
7  1,871  1,168  -4,585b
8  1,865  1,163  -4,584b
9  1,857  1,156  -4,584b
10  1,846  1,146  -4,584b
11  1,829  1,131  -4,583b
12  1,806  1,110  -4,583b
13  1,772  1,081  -4,582b
14  1,723  1,038  -4,580b
15  1,657  978  -4,578b
16  1,561  893  -4,575b
17  1,424  771  -4,571b
18  1,229  598  -4,566b
19  952  352  -4,557b
20  557  -19.66
b -4,739b
aBecause borrower is a new customer, previous repayment  status
is unknown.
b Credit denied because present value of optimal policy is less than
zero.
ble over  time.  Expected  probabilities  of full,
partial, and no repayment in the second period
are 89.8%,  5.3%, and 4.9%, respectively-not
statistically  different  from  first-period  expec-
tations.
Optimal  Decision Rules
Given the case farm's expected probability of
repayment,  an  average operating  loan size of
$84,636,  and profit margins described  above,
a myopic  decision rule that does not consider
the value of future credit extensions is to deny
the loan request. Single-period expected gross
returns are $612 but expected costs including
those  of default  are  $623  resulting  in an  ex-
pected payoff of - $1 1.
Optimal decision rules for granting  operat-
ing credit  over  a finite  horizon  are  obtained
when  the  DP  credit  granting  model  is  esti-
mated  (table  3).  The  expected  payoff of fol-
lowing  such  a policy  and  granting  operating
credit to the case farm borrower is $1,190. This
value  includes the present value of all future
credit extensions as well as the possibility that
borrower patronage  ceases.
At the end of the first period, expected future












Figure 2.  Value  of optimal credit policy  when lender's discount rate and customer patronage
vary
payoffs of  granting operating credit another pe-
riod to case farm borrowers  that fully repaid,
partially  repaid,  and  did not repay  credit  in
the  last  period  are  $1,882,  $1,178,  and
-$4,585, respectively. Hence, an optimal pol-
icy at this stage is to deny credit if the borrower
defaulted on previous operating loans. Because
operating margins  are  small  and costs  of de-
fault high,  defaulting borrowers  are not given
a second  chance.
Lenders continue to grant the case farm credit
until year  20  as  long  as farmers  fully  or par-
tially repay.  At that time,  credit  will only be
granted if full repayment  occurred in year  19.
Future  payoffs  from  extending credit  to bor-
rowers  who  only  partially  repaid  are  insuffi-
cient to warrant credit extension during the last
period.
The repetitive utilization of credit affects the
initial credit granting decision.  One reason the
myopic and optimal decision rules could differ
is if probabilities  of repayment  were not sta-
tionary with respect to'time. However, as not-
ed above, this is not the case.  Granting credit
to the case  farm is only profitable  if the bor-
rower continues to patronize the institution in
the future.  Borrowers could demand more fa-
vorable credit terms and reap a portion of the
lender's profits at the time of loan origination
if  assurances of  future patronage could be guar-
anteed. Likewise, lenders may rationally deny
credit to borrowers who are over an age thresh-
old because  future patronage  is uncertain.
The value of the optimal policy  is sensitive
to changes  in a lender's discount rate and as-
sessment of a borrower's patronage  (figure 2).
As a lender's discount rate increases or expec-
tations  of customer  patronage  decrease,  the
value  of the  optimal  policy  declines.  These
variables likely differ by lender. Hence, a lend-
er's  characteristics,  in addition  to those  of a
borrower,  determine whether operating credit
is granted.
Value of Credit Scoring
There is a second application of the DP credit
granting model. The recursive relationshipJTn,
i) provides  the  present  value  of an  optimal
credit granting policy from  year  n to the end
of  the  planning  horizon,  given  repayment
probabilities p(n, i, j). The value of techniques
employed  by lenders  when  evaluating  a bor-
rower's credit worthiness,  such as credit scor-
ing  and discriminate  analysis,  which  lead to
improved estimation  of p(n,  i, j), can be  as-
certained with the recursive  relationship.
After evaluating the representative  new bor-
rower,  lenders in the survey expected  default
on  the  first-year  operating  loan  with  6.7%
probability.  During  the  experiment,  some
lenders  systematically  evaluated  borrowers,
while  others did not. Figure  3 illustrates  how
improved credit scoring techniques  can influ-
ence  the present  value  of an  optimal  credit
granting policy.  Such  methods would further
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Figure 3.  Value  of optimal credit granting policy  given  varying probabilities of default
allow  lenders  to  identify  and  deny  credit  to
marginal  borrowers-increasing  the odds  re-
maining customers will repay.
If improved  evaluation techniques had  led
lenders  to expect  half the default  rate,  3.4%
rather than 6.7%, the value of the optimal pol-
icy  would  have  risen  $414  (from  $1,190  to
$1,604).  This value would  increase  further if
probability estimates of repayment beyond the
first period were  also revised  upward.  Given
these  payoffs,  lenders,  either  individually  or
cooperatively with peer institutions, could de-
vote  more  resources  to  the  development  of
improved credit scoring models and place less
emphasis on the ad hoc methods of evaluation
noted by Lufburrow,  Barry,  and Dixon.
Development of the DP model alters the role
of scoring  models  in lenders'  credit  granting
decisions.  With  subjective  interpretation,
lenders previously translated credit scores di-
rectly into  lending  decisions.  If a borrower's
score was above (below) some threshold level,
credit was granted  (denied).  Now the role  of
scoring  models  becomes  more  narrowly  fo-
cused and objective-integrating  knowledge of
a borrower's production,  financial, marketing,
management, and personal characteristics into
the  specification  of transition  probabilities.
Once formulated,  the transition  probabilities,
revenue, and costs of extending credit can be
explicitly evaluated  in a dynamic setting and
optimal credit granting decisions determined.
Conclusion
Optimal  credit  granting  policy  requires  bal-
ancing  the  expected  gains  from  extension
against possible losses associated with default.
Gains from  extending credit not only include
those of the current period but also the present
value of all  future  returns.  Presented  in this
article  is  a dynamic  loan profitability  model
that quantifies  the importance of those future
returns in the lender's decision. Overall results
demonstrate the sensitivity of an optimal pol-
icy's  value  to changes  in a lender's  discount
rate, a borrower's future repayment status, and
patronage.
A major  limitation of this  study  relates to
estimating  the transition  probabilities  p(n,  i,
j). When  solving  any dynamic  programming
model  for a nontrivial  number of states,  the
number  of parameters  to be  estimated  soon
exceeds  available  data. In this study,  param-
eters could only be estimated for the first two
stages of the problem.  Thus,  the greatest  po-
tential for improving the model would be col-
lecting  additional  data  that  test whether  re-
payment  probabilities  beyond  the  second
period are constant. The findings of this study
also could be broadened by replicating the study
in other geographic areas and  periods and by
including the level of detail currently embod-
ied in static loan profitability models.
[Received July 1988; final revision
received January  1989.]
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